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An Ethically Nonindifferent Aesthetics
An Interview with Mieke Bal
“Pathos dictates emotions; affect avoids
that dictation without allowing indifference”
jacob lund. In the introduction to Acts of Memory you and your coedi-
tors, Leo Spitzer and Jonathan Crewe, understand memory as a cultural 
phenomenon and see cultural memorization as an activity that takes 
place in the present, “in which the past is continuously modified and 
redescribed even as it continues to shape the future.”1 In accordance with 
this view of memory, others, for instance Andreas Huyssen, understands 
it as recherche a la Proust rather than recuperation, as a cultural con-
struction in the present rather than a storage and retrieval system.2 In 
your recent book Loving Yusuf you write of cultural memory as the ca-
pacity to “have” the memories of other people3 and take as your theoreti-
cal themes this cultural memory and the social production of meaning, 
on the one hand, and on the other, modes of representation and their 
effects.4 I would like to accentuate and examine the aesthetic aspects 
and issues concerning cultural memory in which the object of memory 
is something that is mediated, constructed and re-constructed – i.e. in 
which the past is as formed and informed by the present as the present is 
by the past. Ernst van Alphen describes how it is the artistic rather than 
the historical and documentary modes of representation of past events, 
in his case the Holocaust, that make us reflect upon them and thus actu-
alise them in the present.5
How would you describe the role of the aesthetic in relation to memo-
ry, and do you think that this role has changed within the last four or five 
decades, perhaps as part of a more general aesthetizisation of Western 
societies?
miek e ba l . I cannot answer the last part of your question, simply be-
cause I don’t believe such historical sweeps are possible. Speaking of “a 
more general aesthetizisation of Western societies” seems to me to both 
idealise Western societies and to underestimate the aesthetic quality of 
”non-Western societies” (a negative phrase I abhor), which we simply 
cannot judge from the outside. But to the first part of your question, after 
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stating that I endorse both Huyssen’s and Van Alphen’s views, I would 
like to explain how I see the aesthetics of memory through the detour of 
an aesthetic work. The reason I need this detour is that I feel compelled 
to qualify what I mean by “aesthetic”. 
Finnish cinematographer Eija-Liisa Ahtila is doubtlessly best known 
through her work The House, which was a huge success at Documenta 
XI in 2002. Like many of Ahtila’s later works, The House clearly revisits 
the idea of psychosis as dealt with in her Me/We, Okay, Gray and other 
early video installations. Psychosis, then, rather than the aesthetic is the 
“ground” or “field” on which memory is cast. In this work, psychosis is 
taken literally, or, to use that strongly contested word, “authentically”. A 
young woman describes her house in the woods, and demonstrates the 
sliding shift from normality to psychosis when her house seems to melt 
down and the world enters her head. 
How does psychosis end up in an aesthetic work? Not, of course, in 
documentary fashion. The House is based on interviews with people suf-
fering from psychosis. But this authentic background of suffering is nei-
ther represented in the work in any obvious way, nor is it appropriated 
for aesthetic purposes. Both alternatives would be politically problemat-
ic, first of all because the way people are represented is in itself a political 
issue. Representation would be voyeuristic, and the concomitant appro-
priation would be exploitative. Instead, the transformation of documen-
tary into aesthetic is performed by means of affect, which empowers the 
mentally ill subjects – more on which later.
Instead, the aesthetic comes in when the young woman named Elisa 
who is the protagonist of The House, the sole character and the narrator 
of this triptych installation, is the figure bearing the mental illness that 
is staged in representation. I cannot avoid this somewhat clumsy circum-
scription if I wish to avoid a realist reading, which would partake of the 
problems alluded to above. As the work itself offers clear indications that 
it is not realistic, such a reading will not only be false rhetorically; it will 
also fail to do justice to the inextricable bond between the work and reality. 
I am even inclined to generalise this point: realism by definition distorts, 
obscures, and otherwise bypasses the bond between art – or literary works 
– and reality. Realism, in this sense, is an aesthetic of deception.
If I try to see the work in that perspective, at some point near the 
ending a thematic element suddenly comes to the fore that prefigures ele-
ments of Ahtila’s later work. Hinting at what is yet to come, and judging 
from the things Elisa says, I see as the primary subliminal theme – to 
which the works can by no means be reduced – the question of refugees. 
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Even before developing it I immediately want to complicate this seem-
ingly thematic interpretation; for thematics is a handmaiden of realism 
in the sense I just described. Beyond the political issue itself, which is 
so crucial in our time, this work about the house with the melting walls 
first of all takes another step toward extending and generalising the dis-
solution of boundaries. The allusion to refugees is merely subliminal; 
to prevent it from becoming another master narrative, it must remain a 
“little narrative” if it is to retain its political agency.6 In order to succeed, 
the precarious bond between art and politics, mutually dependent, needs 
to be cherished and kept alive. This breathing space provides a theoreti-
cal holding environment. That is to say, the work cannot belong to or be 
appropriated by the realm of party politics and propaganda. 
In spite of being merely a little narrative, the allusion is powerful. Allu-
sions, as distinct from metaphors, are small and unobtrusive, yet “in touch 
with” what they allude to. They preclude collapsing meanings, but they 
also preclude distance. They draw images from the realm of iconicity to 
that of the index. 
The shift from metaphor, the figure that facilitates distance and col-
lapse in favor of allusion, the figure of indexical “touchiness” and unob-
trusive smallness, saves the bond between aesthetics and politics from 
dissipating into the anti-aesthetic of ineffective propaganda. To achieve 
this salvaging, cinema deploys the medium of affect. This subliminal 
message is proposed, but not enforced by affect, and not by the poor logic 
of persuasion either. It works by allusion – the closest affect will come to 
meaning and content – and not by metaphor.7
At first sight, however, it is metaphor which appears to be staged. 
Hence the boats Elisa mentions, but whose sounds we hear in hyper-
bolic loudness. The boats are an iconographic reference to the drama 
of contemporary refugees making the perilous journey to a safer life in 
overcrowded boats. When, towards the end of The House, the boundaries 
of the young woman’s subjectivity melt like the walls of her house, she 
says in voice-off:
 I meet people. One at a time 
 they step inside me 
 and fill all the space
 Some for a moment
 Others stay
We are already far removed from being tourists merely visiting Elisa’s 
allegedly disabled but in fact equally hyperabled head. Strangely, the 
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temporal differentiation that memory entails returns when we least ex-
pect it. “Some for a moment, others stay” describes quite precisely the 
temporality of the encounter with refugees, and that of the spectators 
confronting this installation. The “psychoticological” result of this expe-
rience, so meticulously described and auditively staged, is that we can 
only share the rigorous positivity of her final words: “I shake myself and 
say for a long time: good, really good.” After that, all we see is Finn-
ish wooden houses in a lush landscape, inhabited, yet clearly spacious 
enough to accommodate more people. 
Beyond what the model of mental illness allows us to imagine, and 
also beyond the generalizations of philosophy, what enters into Elisa’s 
being is the world of others: refugees, people who come, some to stay, 
some to move on. Standing between Elisa’s images, we are caught in this 
history of the present. Here lies the relevance of the mix of past and pres-
ent tense, of simultaneity and of the present’s failure to shed light on the 
past. Refugees inside you – what clearer image could there be of the im-
possibility of social and political indifference, if I may anticipate one of 
your later questions? This is, indeed, a key image of this work, an image 
of its own political position. More than an image in the sense of represen-
tation based on a reflection on social issues, this key image of refugees 
as being part and parcel of a permeable subject, a subject in “psychosis”, 
poses an aesthetic of ethical nonindifference.
The aesthetic of this work involves the cultural memory of its primary 
form. The triptych form is overdetermined by its long history in Western 
art, and by its employment in religion in the form of altarpieces that 
have given it a solemn importance. Here, it serves one of its multifaceted 
functions. Whereas the triptych usually is a strictly visual form, here it is 
deployed for the creation of an aural space as well. Speaking of another 
installation by this artist, If 6 Was 9, Yli-Annala writes that the triptych 
form in Ahtila’s work serves to “explore a different philosophy of time 
and place.”8 In that work, the installation consists also of three screens, 
but in The House, the two side wings are at a dull angle from the middle 
screen, directly invoking the altar piece of old, as well as inviting the 
viewer inside a space that comes into being only if the viewer yields to 
this call, so that the sound can become a fourth wall. 
This is most compelling when Elisa describes her perception of the 
sounds of the harbor, of the boat, specifically a “paddle boat” she projects 
there. Standing between the screens, surrounded by the sounds of the 
boat, we are inside that sound-generated space. Like Elisa, we lose hold 
of our subjectivity. The specificity – of both the noun and the sound, the 
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tense and the perception – of the paddle boat undermines our sense of 
stability. For me, this is the moment of aural truth; where sound, strong 
and specific in the entire work, becomes the bearer of complex, historical 
meaning. This is cultural memory in aesthetic elaboration for political 
purposes.
To understand how this meaning is both proposed and withheld, the 
following question offers an entrance: why so specifically a paddle boat? 
In the Western imagination, boats overwhelmingly signify the contem-
porary phenomenon of the refugee. Just as trains in film have a “Holo-
caust effect” and helicopters have a “Vietnam effect,” boats have nowa-
days acquired a “refugee effect.” But here the boat is not the overcrowded 
rowing boat we see on television when it lands in Italy or sinks near 
Gibraltar. The specification of this boat as a paddle boat adds historical 
weight to this particular refugee effect here. This is how a sonoric aes-
thetic merges present and past to transform both.
This type of boat Elisa mentions specifically is profoundly anachronistic. 
Although still in use for tourism, it predates the great streams of refugees 
that seem to be evoked here. It also predates Hannah Arendt’s putting the 
term “refugee” forward to explain the origins and consequences of totali-
tarianism.9 Unless we update it to concern us today. While offering ideas, 
the detail also offers theoretical reflection on itself. Referring to the past 
and taken, in its descriptive precision, to denote riverboats on the Missis-
sippi in the Southern U.S.A., the paddle boat is also reminiscent of a past 
that we have interpreted, perhaps too easily, in terms of its pastness. I am 
referring to the history of slavery.10 
One may wonder if I am overinterpreting here. I don’t think so. In 
Arendt’s account, the figure of the refugee, partly autobiographical and 
certainly anchored in subjective experience, is primarily the stateless hu-
man being without rights. Hence, anyone without human rights is thus 
deprived of the very humanity that would be the only “property” remain-
ing. This paradoxical state of the stateless refugee is comparable, if not 
identical, to the state of the slave. Refugees on boats, unable to stay in the 
place where they came from, tossed into deadly peril between enforced 
return, drowning, or arrival in a state of statelessness, defy any optimis-
tic teleology of narrative and of history. They refute the chronology of 
cinema as well as that of our position in the present. The anachronism 
of paddle boats thus throws into question the evolutionist chronologic 
that opposes slavery to its antagonistic successor: individual freedom. In-
stead of liberation, individual freedom produces indifference, and with a 
“boomerang effect”11 or according to a “preposterous” return to the past, 
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indifference returns refugees to the state of slavery. This is how circular-
ity breaks the double linearity of chronologic. If it takes an aesthetic 
work to make this point, then it seems that the aesthetic is, if perhaps not 
indispensable for cultural memory, at least a very helpful tool to make 
cultural memory ”work” against political indifference.12
jacob lund. In Loving Yusuf you argue that cultural memory is the gap 
between “the long-term continuity of the artifact’s existence and avail-
ability on the one hand, and the faster pace of changing communities of 
readers on the other”.13 The artifact or the sign is an element in an essen-
tially mobile social process of meaning making, based on a conception of 
the referent as negotiable and elusive. Offhand, this seems to run counter 
to how the historian comprehends his or her material. Oftentimes, the re-
lationship between history and memory is presented in a highly reduced 
and almost parodic way, as an opposition between scientific objectivity 
and personal subjectivity. How do you view this relationship? Is it a con-
flict, or should we rather see the two as different modes of how to relate 
to the past, modes that supplement each other? Sometimes even inter-
weaved in the same work, for instance in Saul Friedländer’s two volumes 
on Nazi Germany and the Jews. Friedländer’s is a history-writing that 
integrates both the voice of the historian and the memory of the survi-
vors, simultaneously providing commentary and overt interpretation.14 
It is a history-writing that does not pretend to be based on disinterested 
authority but, on the contrary, one that marks its own interestedness – in 
the terminology of Émile Benveniste, perhaps one could say that it has 
given up histoire as its mode of enunciation.
miek e ba l: Friedländer’s history–memory mix is a wonderful example 
of how I, too, see the relationship between the two engagements with 
the past. Let me backtrack a bit to explain where I come from with this: 
“Truth” is the name of the pursuit of scholarship and science, and epit-
omizes in particular the pursuit of the discipline of history. When, in 
1973, Hayden White’s Metahistory appeared, I was exclusively working 
in literary theory, and with my structuralist bend, not too versed in con-
siderations of history. What I studied was the imagination; a richer field 
I could not imagine. But we literary theorists were somewhat embattled 
by those who did not believe the imagination had anything to do with 
reality, and could therefore not be subjected to the test of “truth.” I coun-
tered that the imagination is part of reality, even if the worlds it produces 
may not exist. 
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I remember vividly how colleagues came into the building waving 
this new miracle book. For those of us on the far side of the historical 
vs. structural approaches, the appearance of this spectacular book was, 
indeed, a bit of a miracle. It vindicated our supposition that those col-
leagues who contradicted everything we said about literature, with the 
injunction to “Historicise! Historicise!” and scolded us for “formalism,” 
and worse, “interpretation,” were wrong. They were just blind to their 
own interpretative and formal choices. The word ”imagination” in the 
subtitle, yoked to the qualifier “historical,” made our case.
Those were days of fierce polemics, when we had not yet learned to be 
nuanced and to refuse being locked up in binary oppositions. You either 
did history, or you were “ahistorical”, and hence, dismissed. My sense of 
“form” – of the aesthetic side of the artifacts I studied and the influence 
of form on meaning – was too strong to compromise, and I happily called 
myself a “formalist.” When I started to work on visual art and realised 
that simultaneously with White’s “formal,” indeed, literary turn in histo-
riography, the contextual turn was beginning to rage in art history, and 
there “formalism” rapidly became a fresh taboo. 
And then, here was a book about the historical imagination – some-
thing that seemed almost inconceivable by definition. This book told us 
that historians too adopt a form, interpreting their alleged “data” after 
first selecting these according to principles of form. It bluntly stated on 
one of its first pages that: “My method, in short, is formalist”15; some-
thing I would never have dared say out loud. To adopt a formalist meth-
odology at the time – and I see this as a historical moment – was to 
endorse a certain universalism of forms. Indeed, one of the constructive 
critics, of whom White has so many, criticised him on that point: he did 
not historicise his own categories of analysis.16 
For me, this was not so clear. Not that Van Alphen was wrong in argu-
ing that White did not historicise his categories. But I believed then, and 
still believe, that such historicisation is both possible and beside the pri-
mary point. Universalizing formalism has never been the only possible 
alternative to what we, alleged formalists, sometimes a bit easily labeled 
as “naïve historicism.” I did not see White as stepping over from one side 
of the picket fence to the other. For me, the book that made White famous 
across the disciplines overnight was not to be limited to the formalist 
side of a formalism–historicism divide, but instead cut right through that 
opposition, as well as through others. My excitement came from that 
realization. The key that opened all doors was the word “imagination.”
Suddenly, I had an ally coming from the other side, bridging – as I 
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sought to do – that divide that had so far made meaningful progress 
on either side difficult. Decades later, it was the figure of Joan of Arc 
that made me realize how profound White’s impact on my thinking had 
been. The 2000 slide installation Du mentir-faux by Belgian artist Ana 
Torfs, a complex representation of the trial of Joan of Arc in what White, 
following Barthes, would call the “middle voice”,17 undermines binary 
opposition in rigorous and multiple ways. Like the writings of those old 
masters of history that White analyzes, Torfs’ artwork approaches the 
story through her “historical imagination.”18 
I never believed that it was true that my work – or any work that was 
“formalist” in the sense that form was taken seriously as meaningful and 
meaning-producing – was for that reason ahistorical. It was, I realized 
retrospectively, Metahistory that had delivered me, not of history, but of 
the stigma that indicted my work for ahistoricism. What I have always 
considered eminently historical about White’s position is the fact that he 
firmly positioned his analysis, not just in relation to form, representa-
tion, and ideology, but in the present of his thinking and writing; in a 
temporal version of his beloved “middle voice” – a preference he express-
es in Friedländer’s volume, and which he shares with the volume’s editor.
White’s book may have been suspected of an aesthetic formalism of its 
own. Its typology of four categories seems too systematic to be plausible 
– in the same way as Charles Sanders Peirce’s threesomes are too neat to 
be true. But that comparison actually gives White excellent company. For 
in Peirce’s work, if not so obviously in White’s, the oversystematization 
of the categories makes it possible to follow, and play with that system 
to get at nuances that would have remained unseen otherwise. In the 
case of Peirce, and perhaps also of White, I would even go so far as to 
say that over-categorization helps rather than hinders a liberation from 
taxonomy’s strait-jacket; that it is the over-categorization that allows for 
a bold amount of messiness in the analyses. This is manifest in applica-
tions of Peirce’s categories.19 
Thus, Peirce’s threesomes only work if one deploys them to map over-
laps and crossings. To give a well-known example: the sign that indicates 
the exit of, for instance, a train station pertains to the symbolic, indexi-
cal, and iconic grounds all at once. The interrupted square iconically rep-
resents the exit; the arrow indicates it by continuity, which is contiguity, 
and the convention by which we see this sign all the time, its symbolism, 
makes it readable. The brilliant philosopher knew very well that not ev-
erything in the universe or the human mind can be divided into three 
possibilities, on the contrary. In my view, he made them threesomes for 
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other reasons than a systemic (over)drive. If I may speculate by taking 
the effect for the cause, he did so, firstly, to deliver us from the domina-
tion of binary opposition; secondly, to establish a dynamic, a temporal 
element; and thirdly, to make it possible, indeed, indispensable, to keep 
moving from one point of the triangles to another, none of them ever 
being satisfactory on its own as a label that would characterize a single 
phenomenon. In short, one system was mobilized to beat another, so that 
in the end, users of his theory were given tools to make up their own 
combinatoire. 
For me, White’s book had a similar effect. His categories are so clearly 
readerly devices, hints for establishing contexts and connections, rather 
than rigid grids, that I would venture to say that his “system” of foursomes, 
in its invitation to disobey it, virtually contains its own historicisation, but 
as established in the present. The casual language in which he introduces 
these foursomes already indicates this.20 And, even when he is on his best 
academic behavior and leaves his tongue out of his cheek, his discourse 
cannot be locked up in an either/or (formalist or historicist) camp. 
White characterizes historical writing as follows:
a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be 
a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining 
what they were by representing them.21 
In the first half of the description, formalist terms abound: a historical 
work as a (verbal) structure; in a particular form, espousing a semiotic 
mode – narrative – and a discourse that, as we have learned from Fou-
cault, produces what it analyzes; a model to be followed or an icon to 
keep the work protected from change. In the second half, however, we 
counter the terms that are contested at the other side of the formalism/
historicism divide. The structures are now in the past, even if they re-
main structures and, hence, are “contaminated” by the formalism of the 
first half. The term “interest” stipulates a goal-orientedness that, after 
Habermas (1972), we cannot take lightly either. If this is formalism, then 
there is no opposite easily captured.22
In this, White remains abreast of those who come after him. Fellow 
historiographers Hans Kellner and Frank Ankersmit – coeditors, with 
Ewa Dománska, of a recent volume devoted to White’s influence23 – char-
acterized Metahistory as debunking the traditional conception of history. 
Kellner saw it as an attempt to “challenge the ideology of truth”;24 An-
kersmit called it “postmodernist”.25 Both these responses remain – given 
the academic climate at the time, understandably – bound to a binary 
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opposition in which “truth” is one thing, and form, or relativism, is an-
other. It almost seems a question of personal preference. Ankersmit’s 
later book on historical experience26 explicitly makes this an acceptable 
choice for a historian.27 
Detractors and admirers alike have kept their loyalty to the pact of 
binary opposition, with truth on one side, and myth (Bann), language 
(Harlan), narrative (Partner), or rhetoric (Megill) on the other, even if 
they admire and approve of the mix. Yet, all these terms are complicated 
in White’s hands. Myth, in White’s vision, becomes “remythification”;28 
language becomes poetic or “a verbal structure”;29 narrative, story and 
“emplotment”;30 and rhetoric, signs.31 None of these alternative terms can 
be opposed to truth. Instead, as some of White’s articles demonstrate, 
the problem is binary opposition itself. And if I apply that critique to the 
distinction between history and memory, you can see why I end up in a 
near-indifference to the question itself.
jacob lund. You write of “being embedded in cultural memory”32 
which means that what we witness – or perceive of events and artifacts 
– and remember is predetermined and conditioned by certain values and 
ideas. Your wish is to become aware of this predetermination in cultural 
memory and to make it explicit – and to be “a reluctant witness to memo-
ries, my own and those of others”.33 How does this cultural memory come 
about? And what is the relationship between individual and cultural 
memory in which the individual is embedded? How does this relation-
ship relate to your distinction between a literal reading that takes the 
signifier, words and images, seriously, and a fundamentalist reading that 
takes the signified, which is arbitrarily fixed, as its law?34
miek e ba l . Hey, there are three different questions here. I cannot an-
swer the first, how this cultural memory comes about, except by saying 
that memory is always cultural, since the subject is steeped in culture. 
The second question, how cultural memory relates to individual memo-
ry, is also only answerable in very general terms. There is no individual. 
Not, at any rate, one who can escape culture. We have seen what happens 
to those who try through the many mythical representations of “wild 
children” brought up outside society.
Every personal, individual memory, touches – or is indexically bound 
to – memories of others. These are different yet structurally comparable. 
For example, the memories I invoke at the beginning of Loving Yusuf 
are not individual. That is why I had to specify that ”I attended a catho-
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lic girls-only school in a predominantly protestant village near Haarlem 
in the Netherlands” and that the storytelling that had such an impact 
on me happened ”in the afternoon, when concentration is hard to mus-
ter, [and] the classroom was hot”. Key to the memory is also its negative 
side, namely the fact that I learned about a sexual transgression without 
knowing about sex, hence, without being able to frame what I heard. Per-
haps that is why it became a memory in the first place. The first chapter 
of Loving Yusuf explains the concept of cultural memory as, again, not 
the opposite of individual memory but its necessary condition. 
In that chapter I also make the argument about the distinction be-
tween literalism and fundamentalism. I argue that the interest in the 
precise wording is a reading attitude, which I call literalism. I am a strong 
advocate of that reading attitude. On the other hand, the idea that the 
texts also contain the questions we ask of them is, I will argue, akin to 
fundamentalism. My argument in that book sought to carefully delineate 
the distinction between these two understandings of textuality and read-
ing. The one treasures the cultural inheritance, and opens it up for the 
contemporary world. It sides with cultural memory, deploying the tools 
of culture to instill memories in culture’s participants. The other makes 
a devastating appeal to an immutably referential, prescriptive meaning; 
an appeal that is based on a radical denial or negligence of how signs 
work, and of memory as well.
In terms of what I said above about the cultural memory of slavery 
as a way to actualize the question of refugees in the present, it is useful 
to consider the temporalities at stake in the merging of individual and 
cultural memory. There are two paces at work – the long-term continuity 
of the artifact’s existence and availability on the one hand, and the faster 
pace of changing communities of readers on the other. Between these 
two paces the inevitable discrepancies define what has been called “cul-
tural memory.” To put it simply, cultural memory is the gap – sometimes 
abyss – between the words on the page and the meanings such as the one 
I took home, that winter day in the 1950s from the overheated classroom. 
The question “Why?” in interpretive studies of older artifacts is the most 
tangible site of that cultural memory. As such, it is neither “in” the text 
nor outside of it, but “into” it, towards it; it is the reader’s relationship to 
the text.
jacob lund. Do you see a danger of a negative form of “preposterous 
history” or history writing when it comes to the representation of e.g. 
the Shoah? In Quoting Caravaggio35 you write of art’s dealings with past 
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works: “the work performed by later images obliterates the older images 
as they were before that intervention and creates new versions of old 
images instead.”36 If we were to make a parallel to the representation of 
Auschwitz – if we regard Auschwitz and what took place there as a kind 
of “old image” – or some other actual, perhaps traumatic event, is there 
not a danger of losing sight of this event, of obliterating it, when artists 
act upon it? When we enter the postmemory of Auschwitz and the events 
become what James E. Young has termed a “vicarious past”, images and 
texts – and some other re-presentations – are all we have. Is there a dan-
ger of turning the “original” events into something else, of creating “new 
versions of old images”, or is this perhaps not necessarily to be regretted 
as some kind of distortion?37 
m iek e ba l . Let me address this point before going on with the ques-
tion (which is in fact a multiple one again). I don’t think the concept of 
preposterous history is negative. On the contrary, if the present has such 
power over the past as the concept implies, then the responsibility that 
comes with it is equally great. This is why revisionist historians and Hol-
ocaust deniers can be held responsible, indeed brought to justice. There 
is no other way to deal with the past, and historians know it. As you say 
yourself, “images and texts – and some other re-presentations – are all 
we have”. Hence, preposterous history is the closest you can come to re-
sponsibly keeping the past alive. That this agency comes with distortion 
is perhaps regrettable; but it beats forgetting, denying, or romanticizing. 
The new images can be held up to the light of cultural memories of oth-
ers, and of the old images that, with the problematic of reading them, is 
still all we have. 
jacob lund. You want to oppose the tendency “to lump together differ-
ent stories as ‘versions’ of the same one”.38 How should we comprehend 
the stories and depictions of Joseph/Yusuf and Potiphar’s wife that you 
analyse in Loving Yusuf ? Do they share the same fabula, only with differ-
ent sujets, or is there more than one fabula? What is it that brings them 
together? 
miek e ba l . Here, I would say that what brings them together is the 
simple fact that they have been brought together; their having been read 
as versions rather than being versions. The notion of a common fabula 
is already tenuous; but as long as we recognize that fabulas are never 
identical, only conventionally considered so. In other words, the textual 
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material of my book is collected on the (admittedly shaky) ground that 
they have been collected before. My pursuit in the analysis is to decom-
pose that unity; to argue for their differences. 
jacob lund. Could we, inspired by Hayden White, speak of them as 
different emplotments of the same “historical facts”? When it comes to 
actual historical events, something did take place. There are some facts 
that can be narrated in different ways, different versions, or should we 
rather speak of different “versionings”, understood as rereadings that al-
ter the alleged model, “the old image”, radically, not only in relation to 
myths and stories but also in relation to actual historical events? 
miek e ba l . Yes, emphatically, something did take place. That is not 
the question. The question is what did take place and what did it mean 
to whom? The historical truth of the Holocaust is not enough to keep 
its memory alive. On the contrary, on the basis of its undeniable truth 
it is exploited to erase other memories, other unethical acts. To say, for 
example, that Israel has the right to treat Palestinians the way it does 
because of the Holocaust is an unacceptable abuse of historical truth, 
which, moreover, is close to denial because such lame apologies fail to 
take Israel seriously as a nation. This example, in all its painful actuality, 
demonstrates that establishing historical truth is useless if there is no 
”preposterous” ethical accounting attached to that truth.
jacob lund. Do you think Aristotle’s distinction between history and 
poetry might be of any relevance here? According to Aristotle, the histo-
rian tells what happened and gives particular facts while the poet tells 
what might happen. Poetic insight does not regard any particular event 
but its universal form, and poetic representation – consisting in the con-
catenation of events into a fable, a narrative – is the imitation of this uni-
versal form.39 It is a universalisation of the singular, and it is in a certain 
sense through such universal forms we become able to communicate and 
share our experiences of past events. 
mieke bal. Sorry, I cannot argue by means of universals. I think this dis-
tinction has run its course and remains locked up in binary opposition.
jacob lund. Many theorists have understood trauma as the central cat-
egory when addressing the larger memory discourse. You seem to have 
avoided the temptation to see trauma as the hidden core of all memory, to 
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collapse memory into trauma and thus to mark memory too exclusively 
in terms of pain, suffering, and loss.40 You do, however, incorporate theo-
ries of trauma in your work on cultural memory. How do you see the 
relationship between memory and trauma, what is the role of trauma in 
your theory of cultural memory? Do you see a particular potential in art 
and the aesthetic when it comes to communicating, and perhaps healing, 
traumatic experiences?
miek e ba l . Healing: no. Art cannot heal. At most, it can create the con-
ditions under which healing can begin to take place. One of those condi-
tions is an openness to the value of the imagination. Along with its major 
theorists, I consider trauma the impossibility of memory. As I wrote in 
the introduction to Acts of Memory, trauma is formally similar to theater; 
a theater without director and where the actors are automatons. Memory, 
in contrast, is narrative, and thus allows for the embedding necessary to 
take agency over what is being narrated. But in the larger field of culture, 
trauma must be recognized and remembered. 
jacob lund. With reference to Derrida’s analyses of how any speech 
act – or any communicative act in general, for that matter – is enabled by 
an iterability or repeatability, you claim that the Deleuzian lesson “rep-
etition is difference” is an indispensable insight for a theory of cultural 
memory.41 Could you explain the importance of this insight for a theory 
of cultural memory?
miek e ba l . Without repetition, memory cannot be shaped, performed. 
Without differences, memories become ideologies; weapons in political 
strife and oppression. See the example of Israel. 
jacob lund. In relation to Milton’s Paradise Lost you propose to exam-
ine “how ethical nonindifference, far from being indifferent to aesthetics, 
informs the novel’s artistic merit on its – the novel’s – own aesthetic 
terms”.42 Could this be said to pertain to all memorial art?
miek e ba l . As my answers and examples above have suggested, mem-
ory is subject to ethical directives. With art being a public endeavor, it is 
an ideal site for the cultural embedding of the ethical issues involved in 
memory. In this sense, which for me is fundamental, I’d say yes, memo-
rial art is subject to a stringent ethical imperative that prescribes, so to 
speak, ethical nonindifference. 
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